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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BINARY & THE INTERSEX
A joyful mother announces, “It’s a boy!” at her baby’s “gender
reveal” party as blue balloons fill the room. And suddenly, the “it”
becomes human. Our gender makes us worthy of a pronoun. Without
gender do we really exist? In a society where gender is the most
relevant category, it can be hard to imagine where a genderless
individual would fit in society. As Judith Butler explains, individuals
37
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who do not fit into the binary frame of gender identity, male or female,
are disconcerting to society because they have the perceived effect of
destabilizing the “coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual
practice, and desire.”1 It is no wonder then, that those children born
intersex or with ambiguous genitalia are treated as requiring
immediate medical intervention—as something that needs to be
“corrected.”2 A child born without a gender is analogous to an
individual without a State—the very documents conferring citizenship
require an affirmative “male” or “female” designation.3
This Article considers the interests at stake in the decision to
subject a child to “corrective” intersex surgery by weighing the
benefits of allowing the surgery against the potential violation of a
child’s fundamental rights. Given the nature of the interests involved,
only constitutional safeguards provide sufficient protection for intersex
children. Part I provides a working definition of intersex and briefly
outlines past and current medical discourse. Because this Article deals
with constitutional rights, the Fourteenth Amendment in particular,
Part II explicates State action in the intersex context, suggesting that
the State should be involved as a third-party arbiter. Part III explores
the constitutional rights of intersex children and their parents by
weighing each right against relevant State interests. Part IV concludes
with the recommendation that, before any medical action is taken, a
neutral party should consider all of these competing interests in order
to ensure every decision is grounded in fundamental constitutional
norms.
II. PART I: DEFINING INTERSEX
According to the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA),
“‘Intersex’ is a general term used for a variety of conditions in which a
person is born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that does not

* J.D. Candidate 2016, Florida State University College of Law. My thanks to
Professor Courtney Cahill for her support and feedback.
1
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
23 (1990).
2
Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect
Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 83 (2006) (“Only in a
society in which sex is understood in binary terms (everyone is either male or
female) does the hermaphroditic body become abnormal. Rather than
conceptualizing such individuals as . . . occupying various points along a sex
continuum, our society chooses to see them as suffering abnormalities that require
repair.”).
3
Jo Bird, Outside the Law: Intersex, Medicine and the Discourse of Rights, 12
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 65, 68 (2005).
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seem to fit the typical definitions of female or male.”4 A number of
conditions are classified as “intersex.” For example, an intersex infant
may have “normal” male genitalia and female hormones,5 or the
intersex infant may be born with ambiguous genitalia and XY
chromosomes.6 Globally, while some scholars suggest that between
1.7% and 4% of individuals experience some degree of intersexuality,7
other scholars estimate that merely 0.08% of infants are potentially
subjected to genital “normalization” surgery each year.8
What to do about intersexuality, or whether anything should be
done at all, remains controversial in the medical and legal
communities. Historically, intersexuality was considered to be a
medical emergency, and “treatment” for the condition was founded on
a nurture-based theory of gender identity.9 Under this theory, “a child
who has normative-looking genitals from a very early age, and is
raised ‘unambiguously’ in the gender that matches those genitals, will
develop the desired gender identity regardless of chromosome pattern,
body structure at birth, or hormone exposure in the womb.”10 As such,
sex was primarily assigned based on the infant’s external genitalia and
the best possible surgical outcome for “normal” genitalia.11
In 2006, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) endorsed
revised guidelines that outlined the best practices for intersex clinical
management and suggested a number of factors that should influence
gender assignment:
Optimal clinical management of individuals
with DSD [disorders of sexual development]

4

What is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA,
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
5
Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 43
(2004).
6
Sara A. Aliabadi, Gender Assignment Surgery for Intersexed Infants: How the
Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy Both Supports and Opposes a
Moratorium, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 170, 173 (2004).
7
Benjamin Sweeney, The Cobblestones of Good Intentions: Substantive Due
Process and Infant Genital Normalizing Surgery, 13 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 153, 162
(2014).
8
Laura D. Hermer, A Moratorium on Intersex Surgeries?: Law, Science, Identity,
and Bioethics at the Crossroads, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 255, 260 (2007).
9
Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous
Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2000).
10
Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 64.
11
Id. at 66-67 (“A ‘positive surgical outcome’ for a male-assigned baby is a penis
that is capable of penetration at maturity, and that can be used to urinate from a
standing position; a ‘positive surgical outcome’ for a female-assigned baby is a
vagina that can be penetrated by a penis.” (citation omitted)).
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should comprise the following: (1) gender
assignment must be avoided before expert
evaluation in newborns; (2) evaluation and longterm management must be performed at a center
with an experienced multidisciplinary team; (3)
all individuals should receive a gender
assignment; (4) open communication with
patients and families is essential, and
participation in decision-making is encouraged;
and (5) patient and family concerns should be
respected and addressed in strict confidence.”12
Gender assignment should be expedited because “[i]nitial
gender uncertainty is unsettling and stressful for families,” and factors
to be considered “include diagnosis, genital appearance, surgical
options, need for lifelong replacement therapy, potential for fertility,
views of the family, and, sometimes, circumstances relating to cultural
practices.”13 The guidelines make plain that “[e]mphasis is on
functional outcome rather than a strictly cosmetic appearance.”14
However, the authors note that “[i]t is generally felt that surgery that is
performed for cosmetic reasons in the first year of life relieves parental
distress and improves attachment between the child and the parents.”15
While the AAP-endorsed guidelines recognize the complex interplay
of sex, gender, and society, it is evident that remnants of historical
practices permeate the current medical dialogue because nonmedically necessary “corrective” intersex surgeries are still being
performed.16 Moreover, it is important to remember that these are
guidelines and not necessarily an indication of modern practice.17
Contrary to the AAP-endorsed guidelines, some intersex
advocates have demanded that there be a moratorium on all non-

12

Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders,
118 PEDIATRICS 488, 490 (2006).
13
Id. at 491.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143, 145 (4th Cir.
2015).
17
As the ISNA points out, “[A]s wonderful and historic as these changes are, no
institution has fully implemented them. There are no mechanisms . . . in place to
foster implementation nor to evaluate to what extent these changes improve health
care experiences and outcomes for persons and families affected by DSDs.” Dear
ISNA Friends and Supporters, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM.,
http://www.isna.org/farewell_message (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
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medically necessary surgery for intersex infants.18 Moratorium
advocates point to factors such as the number of complications faced
by individuals who received “corrective” intersex surgery.19
According to some studies, the average number of surgeries an
intersex child undergoes is between three and five.20 Individuals who
were subjected to the procedure recount “repeated surgeries
throughout childhood, limited or absent sexual response, painful and
scarred genitals, a sense of shame stemming from repeated and
unexplained medical examinations of their genitals, infertility,
difficulty forming relationships, and depression.”21 Another study
reveals that many intersex individuals would not have chosen the
surgery for themselves and “express regret and anger that surgery was
imposed on them as children.”22 Some scholars go as far as comparing
non-medically necessary surgery performed on children born intersex
to female genital mutilation and suggest that “corrective” intersex
surgery, too, should be prohibited by statute.23 Proponents of the

18

Interestingly, there is a consensus that all children should be assigned a gender—
the controversy stems only from the role of surgical intervention. See April Herndon,
Why Doesn’t ISNA Want to Eradicate Gender?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM. (Feb. 17,
2006, 1:28 PM), http://www.isna.org/faq/not_eradicating_gender.
19
See Aliabadi, supra note 6, at 177 (“Numerous reports describe intersexed
individuals who were assigned as females, and later declared themselves male. In
addition to rejecting their assigned gender in adulthood, surgically-assigned
intersexed individuals also can experience loss of sexual sensation, loss of sexual
function, loss of reproductive potential, and physical pain during sexual activity.”);
Samantha S. Uslan, Note, What Parents Don’t Know: Informed Consent, Marriage,
and Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersex Children, 85 IND. L.J. 301, 303 (2010).
20
Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and
the Selective Condemnation of “Cultural Practices,” 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71,
105 (2005); Kishka-Kamari Ford, “First, Do Not Harm” – The Fiction of Legal
Parental Consent to Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 469, 476 (2001) (“Despite the fact that intersexuality is not a lifethreatening disorder, medical professionals have continued to treat it as an
emergency by focusing not on the physical dangers of ambiguous genitalia but on the
psychosocial problem of intersexuality.”).
21
Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 61.
22
Ford, supra note 20, at 485.
23
Darra L. Clark Hofman, Male, Female, and Other: How Science, Medicine and
Law Treat the Intersexed, and the Implications for Sex-Dependent Law, 21 TUL. J.L.
& SEXUALITY 1, 9-10 (2012) (“Clitoridectomies, performed to make the child’s
genitals cosmetically pleasing, have the same effect on Western intersexed children
that they do on African girls—loss of sexual function and sensation, loss of ability to
achieve orgasm, and psychological trauma. The difference between the two is in the
discourse, not the surgery. We have orientalized clitoridectomies performed on
African girls as a sexist, barbaric practice, often called ‘female genital mutilation,’
while reassuring ourselves that sex-assignment surgery on Western intersexed
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surgery often counter such assertions by pointing to the successes of
gender assignment surgery, the importance of protecting a child’s
psychosocial health, and respecting parental decision-making.24
In sum, although the discourse has evolved to include more
nuanced positions on gender and sexuality, there is no consensus about
how society should react to intersexuality. While this Article does not
propose a definite course of action, it does provide a constitutional
framework for balancing the interests of children, parents, and the
State to serve as guideposts for making medical decisions.
III. PART II: FINDING STATE ACTION IN THE INTERSEX CONTEXT
Common law protections are generally insufficient to prevent
“corrective” intersex surgery from being performed on children. A
common law standard, in which the court considers whether parental
action constitutes abuse or neglect, is problematic for several
reasons.25 First, the standard only considers whether a minimal level
of acceptable conduct has been met.26 In the intersex context,
however, the conduct at issue is not so simple—instead, parents must
make difficult decisions in areas where social consensus is lacking.27
Second, the standard is too amorphous and lacks clear guiding
principles regarding when judicial deference to parental decisions is
appropriate.28 For these reasons, a family court is unlikely to rule
against the professional medical opinion recommending surgery,
especially when given in conjunction with the parents’ wishes.
Instead, invoking constitutional rights adequately protects the
interests of the child. Instead of searching for a minimal level of
acceptable conduct, courts applying constitutional principles will apply
a more searching inquiry—ensuring that the State does not unduly
infringe upon certain individual rights. For an individual to be afforded
constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, there must be State action. The Due Process
Clause “offers no shield” against private conduct, “however wrongful
or discriminatory.”29 There must be “a sufficiently close nexus

children is a scientific procedure, neutral and civilized because it makes intersexed
children ‘normal.’”); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 116 (West 2013).
24
Aliabadi, supra note 6, at 178 (describing arguments in favor of intersex surgery).
25
Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should
Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 2-3.
29
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
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between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.”30
In a small number of scenarios, State action will be apparent.
For example, when a State has legal custody of the intersex child or
when a State hospital board approves gender assignment surgery, there
is little question about whether the State has acted.31 However, the
vast majority of cases will involve private action. Some scholars
suggest that State action is implicated by the very nature of the familyState relationship.32 Under this theory, a parent, in the legal sense, is a
creature of common law, statute, and constitutional protections.33
Furthermore, because parental custody and control is subject to State
regulation and judicial enforcement, the State is, in some sense, always
acting.34 As such, discussing State action in terms of intervention or
nonintervention is an incoherent concept in the family law context.35
While an enticing theory, the argument that State action is
inherent in the parent-child relationship would conceivably invite
constitutional law into every aspect of private life. There are many
areas of the law in which the State ensures or enforces rights—such as
private property and contracts—but extending constitutional
protections to entirely private actions in these areas may raise concerns
about government over-intrusiveness.
Furthermore, the argument that State action is implicated by
the nature of the parent-child relationship is not supported by case law.
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the U.S. Supreme Court promulgated a broader
view of the State action doctrine, holding that judicial enforcement of
a private agreement constituted State action and, thus, implicated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 The Court
stated:
These are not cases . . . in which the States have
merely abstained from action, leaving private
individuals free to impose such discriminations
as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which
30

Id. at 351.
See M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143, 146 (4th Cir. 2015)
(involving a State actor authorizing gender assignment surgery on infant M.C.).
32
B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1338
(2015).
33
Id.
34
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 835-37 (1985) (“[T]he state is deeply implicated in the formation and
functioning of families . . . .”).
35
Id.
36
334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
31
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the States have made available to such
individuals the full coercive power of
government to deny to petitioners, on the
grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of
property rights.37
Similarly, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Court stated:
By its inaction . . . the State[] has not only made
itself a party . . . but has elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the
admitted discrimination. The State has so far
insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence . . . as a joint participant in the
challenged activity, which, on that account,
cannot be considered to have been so “purely
private” as to fall without the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.38
These cases, enunciating the entanglement exception doctrine,
seem to support a more expansive view of State action doctrine—
however, such holdings have been strictly limited to racial
discrimination. Indeed, the Supreme Court ruled out such an
expansive view in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social
Services, holding that the State is not constitutionally liable for failing
to intervene to protect a child from his abusive father.39
In order to warrant Fourteenth Amendment protections for
intersex children, State action must be more explicit. This can be
accomplished in a number of ways, but the surest way to preemptively
protect an intersex child’s fundamental rights is to require the State to
serve as a neutral third-party arbiter, thus forcing the State into an
affirmative relationship with the child. Unlike DeShaney, where the
harm suffered by the child was only indirectly related to the State,40
the action allowing (or disallowing) intersex surgery would be directly
attributable to the State. Practically, each State would need to require
medical facilities to submit any case involving a child born with
ambiguous genitalia to the State review board, prior to any medical
intervention. The State, acting through the neutral arbiter, would
ultimately decide whether or not medical treatment is appropriate. For

37

Id.
365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
39
489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
40
Id. at 203.
38
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reasons discussed below, such requirements are not unprecedented. In
fact, most jurisdictions require parents to seek judicial authorization
before sterilizing their child—regardless of whether or not the parents
and doctors are in agreement.41 This is normatively beneficial because
it ensures the best interests of the child are taken into consideration.
Even more importantly, this requirement guarantees that the child will
receive fundamental right protections both ex ante and ex post. First,
before taking any action, the court or neutral arbiter will be cognizant
of the constitutional implications when reaching a conclusion.
Second, a child may potentially have a legal remedy if it can be proven
that he or she was not afforded adequate due process.
IV. PART III: BALANCING INTERESTS
In order to assess the different interests at stake in the
“corrective” intersex surgery context, a four-step fundamental rights
analysis must be applied. First, it must be determined whether the right
at issue is fundamental.42 A right is fundamental when it is deeply
rooted in history and tradition and is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.43 History and tradition, however, are not the “outer
boundaries” of the fundamental rights analysis.44 Instead, “[w]hen
new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central
protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be
addressed.”45 How specific the right is defined is also critical to this
analysis.46 Second, it must be determined whether the State has
infringed upon that fundamental right.47 The State’s infringement
must be substantial.48 Third, it must be determined whether the State
has a sufficient justification for the infringement.49 Fourth, and
relatedly, it must be determined whether the State’s means are
sufficiently related to the purpose.50 For fundamental rights, the Court
typically applies a strict scrutiny analysis, which requires that the
41

Uslan, supra note 19, at 310.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
43
Id. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (recognizing that this
Nation’s history and tradition “show an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
in matters pertaining to sex”).
44
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015).
45
Id.
46
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (“[W]e have required in substantive-due-process
cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 766-67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
49
Id. at 721.
50
Id.
42
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State’s interest be compelling and the means be narrowly-tailored to
that interest.51
While there is no question that children possess certain
fundamental constitutional rights,52 there is ambiguity about what
those rights are and what constitutes a constitutional infringement.
Oftentimes, a child’s rights are balanced against the constitutional
rights of his or her parents and the interests of the State.53 Part III
applies the fundamental rights framework to the intersex surgery
context. First, Part III looks at whether “corrective” intersex surgery
implicates a child’s fundamental rights. Second, it examines parental
fundamental rights. Finally, it concludes by looking at the State’s
competing interests—respecting parental rights and protecting the
child’s—and considering possible means for the State to effectuate its
goals.
A. The Child’s Fundamental Rights
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”54 The Due Process Clause
contains “a substantive component as well, one ‘barring certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.’”55 The Supreme Court defines substantive
fundamental liberty rights broadly: “At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,

51

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(“[Children] in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State.”); see also Skylar Curtis,
Reproductive Organs and Differences of Sex Development: The Constitutional Issues
Created by the Surgical Treatment of Intersex Children, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 841,
852 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that children have full
constitutional rights that co-exist with parental rights. However, parents sometimes
exercise these constitutionally-protected rights on their child’s behalf, particularly
those rights that relate to their ability to consent to or decline medical treatment.”).
53
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (“[W]hether respondent’s
constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty
interests against the relevant state interests.”). Despite implicating a fundamental
right against bodily intrusions, the Court rarely applies strict scrutiny in this context.
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Constitutionality of Government-Imposed Bodily
Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (2014). Instead, the Court utilizes a
simple balancing test and weighs all relevant interests. Id.
54
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (citing Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
52
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and of the mystery of human life.”56 The breadth of liberty protections
afforded to adults is often limited for children. When a parent’s
fundamental rights come into conflict with his or her child’s, the
parent’s rights will prevail in most circumstances.57 For example, the
Court has held that a child has a substantial liberty interest in not being
subjected to unnecessary medical treatment, but, in the same breath, it
also recognized a parent’s constitutional right to make medical
decisions for his or her child absent a finding of neglect or abuse.58
Crucial to this inquiry is how the fundamental right is defined.
If defined narrowly, the right has very little probability of receiving
protection. For example, courts are unlikely to recognize the
fundamental right to live with ambiguous genitalia or the right to live
as an intersex person.59 Instead, the right must be defined in a way
that closely resembles traditional notions of fundamental rights.
Moreover, there must be a substantial infringement. The harms must
be significant enough to trigger Due Process concerns. This Section of
the article examines two fundamental liberty rights recognized by the
Supreme Court—the right to bodily integrity and the right to
procreate—as applied to children and how “corrective” intersex
surgery has the potential to substantially interfere with each.
i.

Bodily Integrity

The right to bodily integrity is perhaps one of the oldest and
most ingrained traditions of our law.60 “Because our notions of liberty
are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and selfdetermination, the Court has often deemed State incursions into the
body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process

56

Id. at 851.
See Hill, supra note 32, at 1312-13 (“An exception to the model of broad parental
discretion exists only in those cases in which there is a strong likelihood of the parent
confronting a conflict of interests—for example, when a parent seeks to permit a
child to donate an organ or tissue to a sibling.”).
58
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
59
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989) (“What Michael asserts
here is a right to have himself declared the natural father and thereby to obtain
parental prerogatives. What he must establish, therefore, is not that our society has
traditionally allowed a natural father in his circumstances to establish paternity, but
that it has traditionally accorded such a father parental rights, or at least has not
traditionally denied them.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
60
Mary Koll, Note, Growth, Interrupted: Nontherapeutic Growth Attenuation,
Parental Medical Decision Making, and the Profoundly Developmentally Disabled
Child’s Right to Bodily Integrity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 225, 236 (2010).
57
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Clause.”61 Moreover, it is relatively uncontroversial that a child’s
liberty interest encompasses the right to be free from arbitrary bodily
invasion.62 Critical to this inquiry is that the bodily invasion is
arbitrary, thus, medically necessary surgery would not be
unconstitutional.63 Courts have found violations of a child’s right to
bodily integrity primarily in the school and juvenile-detention
contexts, where there is excessive corporal punishment or sexual abuse
by a State actor.64 In the private sphere, courts have been reluctant to
extend such rights. For example, in Deshaney, the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause does not protect children from
parental abuse.65 However, lower courts have upheld the right to
bodily integrity when private actors attempt to subject mature minors
to unwanted medical treatment.66
As case law suggests, a minor’s right to bodily integrity is not
absolute. In the abortion and contraception context, however, the Court
has consistently recognized the right as one not subject to parental
interference. For example, in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, the Court invalidated parental consent
requirements for minors seeking abortions, holding that “the State does
not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute,
and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason
for withholding the consent.”67 Similarly, in Carey v. Population
Services International, the Court, relying on Danforth, suggested that a
minor’s right to contraceptives was equal in breadth to an adult’s right
to contraceptives because the same privacy concerns were

61

Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
62
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (“While the contours of this
historic liberty interest in the context of our federal system of government have not
been defined precisely, they always have been thought to encompass freedom from
bodily restraint and punishment.” (footnote omitted)).
63
Hill, supra note 32, at 1316-17.
64
Id. at 1303.
65
489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
66
Hill, supra note 32, at 1304 (“[I]n In re L., a trial court asserted that a sixteen-yearold minor had a right to ‘free[dom] from unwanted infringements of bodily integrity’
that weighed against her putative father’s request that she undergo a blood test.
Because the father had sought a court order requiring the test to establish his legal
paternity, the court took into account the minor’s right to bodily integrity against the
state. Relatedly, in the case of In re E.G., a state supreme court alluded to the
possibility that minors have bodily integrity rights with respect to end-of-life care.”
(citations omitted)).
67
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976)
(reaffirming the unconstitutionality of absolute parental veto power over abortions).
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implicated.68 Underpinning both of these decisions was the idea that
the State cannot impose its “scheme of values”69 by “prescrib[ing]
pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child . . . as punishment for
fornication.”70
Expanding the minor abortion/contraception right doctrine to
include other grave interferences with bodily integrity is not difficult,
especially given the language the Court has used when describing the
liberty right implicated in the abortion cases. In Casey, the Court
clarified that “Roe [v. Wade], however, may be seen not only as an
exemplar of Griswold [v. Connecticut] liberty but as a rule . . . of
personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases
recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical
treatment or to bar its rejection.”71 This suggests that the liberty right
should be interpreted broadly to include any medical treatment that
infringes on a minor’s right to bodily integrity.
However, despite dicta to the contrary, it is unlikely the Court
will expand the minor abortion/contraception doctrine to include other
violations of bodily integrity. This is because, in the abortion context,
the Court relies heavily on the concept of maturity. One scholar
defines maturity as “[the] foundational concept in all law related to
children . . . . [a]cross numerous areas of the law—including family
law, criminal law, labor law, health law, and other areas—when
children are involved, maturity determinations are pivotal to
outcomes.”72 In Danforth, the Court emphasized that “our holding . . .
does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may
give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.”73 Similarly,
the judicial bypass of parental veto power upheld in Bellotti v. Baird
turned on whether a minor possessed a sufficient level of maturity to
make an informed decision to terminate pregnancy.74 In contrast,
although relying heavily on abortion cases, the majority in Carey did
not rely on maturity and instead looked at the interests at stake

68

431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (“Of particular significance to the decision of this case,
the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to
minors as well as to adults.”).
69
Id. at 695.
70
Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).
71
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
72
Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2012) (citations
omitted).
73
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
74
428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (“In this case, we are concerned with a statute directed
toward minors, as to whom there are unquestionably greater risks of inability to give
an informed consent.”).
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regardless of age.75 The Carey approach makes more sense,
normatively, because it does not make a child’s constitutional rights
contingent upon an abstract concept of maturity. Otherwise, the
concept of constitutional rights devolves into a common law concept
of informed consent. Confusing the latent nature of a child’s
constitutional rights with the notion that they are not absolute is
problematic.76 It is critical to realize that the significant consequences
of a violation of an individual’s bodily integrity are the same
regardless of age or maturity.77
As such, it would seem “corrective” intersex surgery would fit
squarely within a broad definition of the right to bodily integrity.
Clearly, any decision a parent or medical professional makes about a
child’s gender identity would severely impair a child’s right to “define
one’s own concept of existence.”78 Moreover, the sheer invasiveness
of the procedure—oftentimes not medically necessary—is enough to
trigger constitutional considerations.79 As discussed, “corrective”
intersex surgery involves multiple invasive surgeries, potentially
resulting in painful scarring and sexual dysfunction.80 The procedure
has even been compared to the trauma of childhood sexual abuse.81
Although an infant is incapable of making such complex
medical decisions, allowing a third party (e.g., a parent) to make a
decision that implicates the right to bodily integrity in such a
significant way seems contrary to the text of the Due Process Clause

75

Carey, 431 U.S. at 693.
See Curtis, supra note 51, at 859 (“Children have some rights that cannot be
exercised until an older age. For instance, all Americans are constitutionally
guaranteed the right to vote as a method of participating in American democracy, but
may not do so until the age of 18 . . . . This latent right to vote exists, even though it
cannot be readily exercised. As another example, a child is not legally competent to
marry, but the child’s right to choose a spouse upon attaining the age of consent
cannot be infringed by parents ‘irrevocably [betrothing the child] to someone.’
Likewise, parents cannot force a child to marry, even if state law permits the teen to
marry with parental consent. Similarly, a young child has the right to procreate, even
though he or she may not yet be physically capable of doing so.” (citations omitted)).
77
See Hill, supra note 32, at 1314 (“One might argue that pregnant minors are in a
unique situation in that they are facing a decision with profound long-term effects on
the minor’s future—a decision that cannot, moreover, be delayed until the minor
reaches maturity. However, many minors—such as those suffering from terminal
cancer, drug addiction, or sexually transmitted diseases—are virtually
indistinguishable from pregnant minors in terms of the gravity of their situations and
the need for immediate treatment.”).
78
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
79
Ford, supra note 20, at 476.
80
See infra Part I.
81
Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 70.
76
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and surrounding precedent. Defaulting to parental choice because a
minor is not mature enough to make this deeply personal and intimate
decision does not adequately protect the child’s constitutional right to
bodily integrity.82
ii.
Procreation
Closely related to the right to bodily integrity, the right to
procreation is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
suggested the existence of a right to procreate, stating that “[the State]
deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the
perpetuation of a race—the right to have offspring.”83 The Court
further expressed:
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, farreaching and devastating effects. In
evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear. There is no redemption
for the individual whom the law touches. Any
experiment which the State conducts is to his
irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a
basic liberty.84
This “basic liberty” is afforded to all individuals, presumably children
and adults alike.85
In fact, most jurisdictions require judicial authorization before
a parent can opt to sterilize his or her child.86 For example, after
investigating the sterilization of a severely developmentally-disabled
six-year-old girl, the Washington Protection and Advocacy System
concluded that a court order was required under Washington state law
before a sterilization procedure of a minor could commence, and,
82

Id. at 91 (“Any non-consensual surgery implicates the rights to liberty and bodily
integrity. This in itself does not disqualify the parents from serving as decisionmakers. However, the particular invasion of this medical intervention is extreme,
potentially including major reshaping of genitals, removal of orgasmic tissue,
clitorodectomy, and removal of gonads and other internal organs.” (citations
omitted)).
83
316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(affirming the right to procreate).
84
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
85
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
86
Uslan, supra note 19, at 310.
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moreover, that “[c]ourts [also have] limited parental authority to
consent to other types of medical interventions that are highly invasive
and/or irreversible, particularly when the interest of the parent may not
be identical to the interest of the child.”87 Thus, the idea that children
are afforded the right to procreate is relatively uncontroversial.
Despite the relatively straightforward precedent, it is unclear
whether the courts would expand the right to procreate to include the
right not to be subjected to “corrective” intersex surgery. As one
scholar points out, to extend this line of cases to intersex surgery one
would have to prove that the surgery interfered with the right to
procreate, not just the quality of his or her sexuality.88 Although there
is significant evidence that the “corrective” surgery interferes with the
quality of an individual’s sex life,89 it might be the case that not every
“corrective” surgery interferes with the fundamental right to procreate.
Moreover, given the revised AAP-endorsed guidelines emphasizing
the importance of reproductive function, perhaps, as time goes on,
fewer procreative rights will be implicated. However, by removing an
individual’s reproductive organs, there is a very real possibility that
the child will be rendered sterile.90 Because the right to procreate is so
fiercely protected by the Court, it would be contrary to expectations to
ignore the substantial risk “corrective” intersex surgery poses.
iii.

Application of a Child’s Fundamental Rights in the
Intersex Context

A recent case out of the Fourth Circuit illuminates both the
right to bodily integrity and the right to procreate in the context of
“corrective” intersex surgery.91 In April 2006, sixteen-month-old
M.C., who was in the legal custody of the South Carolina Department

87

Koll, supra note 59, at 233-34 (citing David R. Carlson & Deborah A. Dorfman,
Investigate Report Regarding the “Ashley Treatment” 1 (Wash. Prot. & Advoc. Sys.,
2007),
http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Full_Report_Investigati
veReportRegardingtheAshleyTreatment.pdf).
88
Hermer, supra note 8, at 270.
89
See id. at 266 (discussing studies that evaluated the sexual problems postoperative
intersex individuals suffered); Erin Lloyd, From the Hospital to the Courtroom: A
Statutory Proposal for Recognizing and Protecting the Legal Rights of Intersex
Children, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 155, 179-80 (2005) (providing anecdotal
evidence of the sexual dissatisfaction of postoperative intersex individuals).
90
Joshua C. Albritton, Intersexed and Injured: How M.C. v. Aaronson Breaks
Federal Ground in Protecting Intersex Children from Unnecessary GenitalNormalization Surgeries, 24 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 163, 174 (2015).
91
M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143, 147 (4th Cir. 2015).
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of Social Services (SCDSS), was subjected to a gender assignment
surgery.92 M.C. was born intersex and was determined to have
“‘extremely elevated’ testosterone levels and . . . genitalia consist[ing]
of a testicle, an ovotestis with ovarian and testicular tissue, a phallus,
scrotalized labia, a short vagina, and no uterus.”93 Despite the lack of
medical necessity, doctors elected a “feminizing genitoplasty” and
removed M.C.’s phallus, testicle, and testicular tissue.94 Although
originally raised as a girl, as he grew older, M.C. identified himself as
a male and now currently lives as a boy.95 M.C.’s adoptive parents
brought suit against the doctors, who performed the surgery, and
SCDSS for violating M.C.’s constitutional rights.96 Plaintiffs alleged:
“Defendants’ decision to perform irreversible, invasive, and painful
sex assignment surgery was unnecessary to M.C.’s medical wellbeing.”97 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the State violated M.C.’s
constitutional right to procreate by allowing the doctors to
“permanently destroy[] M.C.’s potential male reproductive
function.”98 Plaintiffs further alleged that M.C.’s constitutional right
to bodily integrity was violated when the decision was made to
perform highly invasive, medically unnecessary surgery that “deprived
M.C. of the opportunity to make his own deeply intimate decisions
about whether to undergo genital surgery.”99 The District Court held
that M.C. had alleged sufficient facts to survive summary judgment,
specifically finding that M.C.’s right to procreate was implicated by
SCDSS’s actions.100 However, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case
on qualified immunity grounds.101 M.C.’s experience highlights the
serious constitutional implications of intersex gender assignment
surgery.
In sum, it seems the individual’s right to make decisions about
intersex surgery falls under the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.102 As the Supreme Court notes:
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Id. at 145.
Id.
94
Id. at 146.
95
Id.
96
Complaint at 3, M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143 (4th Cir.
2015) (No. 2:13-cv-01303-DN) (filed May 14, 2013).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, M.C. ex rel. Crawford v.
Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 2:13-cv-01303-DCN) (issued Aug.
29, 2013).
101
Crawford, 598 F. App’x at 149-50.
102
Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
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While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy
have not been marked by the Court, it is clear
that among the decisions that an individual may
make
without
unjustified
government
interference are personal decisions “relating to
marriage . . . procreation . . . contraception . . .
family relationships, and child rearing and
education . . . .”103
The choice to undergo intersex surgery involves many, if not all, of
these concerns. Despite the strong textual and doctrinal support, it is
unlikely that any court will apply such a straightforward analysis
because of the strength of the competing issues at stake. Instead, a
balancing of all the interests involved will likely be the methodology
of choice. We must thus consider the other actors involved, the parent
and the State, before coming to any conclusion about the
constitutionality of “corrective” intersex surgery.
B. Parental Constitutional Rights
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental
rights to bodily integrity and procreation, the Due Process Clause also
“protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”104 This
Section examines the constitutional right to parent, practical
considerations of deferring to parents, and whether deference is
warranted in the “corrective” intersex surgery context.
i.

The Right to Parent

The Court has an extensive history of recognizing the
fundamental nature of parental control over children and has afforded
the right to parent broad protections.105 The constitutional right to

103

Id. (citations omitted).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
105
See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence
historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with
broad parental authority over minor children.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition
of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
104
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parent stems from a concern for family privacy, parental autonomy,
and self-determination—spheres of liberty where State interference is
sharply limited.106 While the contours of the right to parent are not
clearly defined beyond “care, custody, and control,” it has been
broadly interpreted to a number of things, such as body modification
and corporal punishment.107 Unquestionably included in the right to
parent is the parents’ right to make medical decisions on behalf of their
children, with few limitations.108
In addition to having robust constitutional protections, a
number of practical concerns also motivate courts to defer to parental
choice. Given that a child may not be competent to make complex
decisions, the law presumes that a parent will act in the best interests
of the child.109 It has been suggested that deference to parental
decisions benefits the parent, child, and society at large.110 Much like
the constitutional standard, the best interest standard is vague at best.
In the medical decision-making context, the spectrum of parental
deference covers everything from medically necessary procedures to
benign unnecessary surgeries that pose no threat to the child’s
health.111 For example, the Supreme Court of Oregon upheld the right
of a father to impose circumcision on his son.112 Similarly, lower
courts have consistently upheld the ability of parents to consent to
nontherapeutic operations on behalf of a minor.113 Lower courts have

(1923) (“While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to establish a home and bring
up children.”).
106
Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J.
955, 977-78 (2010).
107
Hill, supra note 32, at 1319.
108
Rosato, supra note 25, at 5.
109
Beh & Diamond, supra note 9, at 38-39.
110
Rosato, supra note 25, at 5.
111
Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical
Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant Children?: The Practice of
Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 105-06
(1999).
112
In re Marriage of Boldt, 176 P.3d 388, 394 (Or. 2008) (“We conclude that,
although circumcision is an invasive medical procedure that results in permanent
physical alteration of a body part and has attendant medical risks, the decision to
have a male child circumcised for medical or religious reasons is one that is
commonly and historically made by parents in the United States. We also conclude
that the decision to circumcise a male child is one that generally falls within a
custodial parent’s authority.”).
113
See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (requiring
parental consent for a skin graft of a fifteen-year-old boy); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d
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also recognized the right of parents to refuse medical treatment. In
Newmark v. Williams, after balancing the interests of the child, the
parents, and the State, the Supreme Court of Delaware permitted threeyear-old Colin’s parents to refuse treatment for Burkitt’s
Lymphoma.114 A summary of the best interest standard is best
provided by Anne Tamar-Mattis: “As long as these decisions are in
line with an accepted medical standard of care, courts will rarely
intervene in them.”115
ii.

Limitations on the Right to Parent

Although the spectrum on which parental constitutional rights
fall is broad, it is not unlimited. The Supreme Court curtailed the right
to parent when it stated, “[the] rights of parenthood are [not] beyond
limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor
and in many other ways.”116 The presence of a conflict of interest, or a
situation where it cannot be said that the parents’ interests are identical
to those of the child, may be sufficient to overcome the best interest
presumption.117 Conflicts of interest often occur when medical
treatment is unreasonable or particularly extraordinary and when
countervailing constitutional rights are involved.118 A court may also
find a conflict of interest when the proposed medical treatment
provides no medical benefit to the child.119 Two circumstances where
a court will find in favor of intervention have already been discussed:
sterilization and organ donation.120 The existence of a conflict of
interest warrants heightened judicial scrutiny.

386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (allowing parents to consent to a kidney transplant from
one seven-year-old twin to another); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1969) (allowing the mother of a legally incompetent adult to consent to a
kidney transplant).
114
Newmark v. Williams/DCPS, 588 A.2d 1108, 1120 (Del. 1991) (“Colin’s best
interests were served by permitting the Newmarks to retain custody of their child.
Parents must have the right at some point to reject medical treatment for their
child.”).
115
Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 79.
116
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citations omitted).
117
See Koll, supra note 59, at 248; Rosato, supra note 25, at 43 (“Although not
explicitly named, categorical conflicts have been found to exist in types of cases
where the risk of conflict is so high that court intervention is deemed necessary.”).
118
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
119
Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 94.
120
Curtis, supra note 51, at 851 (suggesting that these two circumstances implicate
three major concerns of the court: “(1) the parents’ potential conflict of interest; (2)

2016]

HANGING IN THE BALANCE

57

Moreover, a court will always intervene when the child’s life is
in danger. The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health when it refused to allow the
parents to remove their daughter’s artificial feeding and hydration
equipment absent clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s
wishes.121 Similarly, although the Supreme Court of New Jersey
upheld a father’s decision to end life-sustaining treatment for his
daughter, the court emphasized that his authority did not stem from his
constitutional right to parent.122
iii.

Application of Parental Rights in the Intersex Context

Clearly, concerns about conflicts of interest are present when a
parent subjects his or her child to “corrective” intersex surgery. Thus,
there should be judicial intervention before any procedures are elected.
In these instances, a parent’s liberty rights come directly into conflict
with the child’s.
Moreover, some scholars suggest that any
“corrective” intersex surgery constitutes “unreasonable, extraordinary
medical intervention[s] that impact significant constitutional interests
of the child.”123 Deference is unwarranted particularly in the intersex
context for several reasons, including: (1) the fact that a parent has no
way of understanding the best interests of a newborn with respect to
gender identity, and (2) the presumption that familial love
underpinning the best interest standard may not be complete or present
when parents are required to make these decisions.124 Drawing on
bioethicist ideals, others have suggested that conflict exists because
any intersex procedure irreversibly interferes with a child’s right to an
open future.125
While these arguments are compelling, how likely will a court
curtail parental decision-making powers? Parents electing to subject

the impairment of the child’s fundamental rights; and (3) the lack of medical benefit
to the child”).
121
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
122
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (“[W]e agree with Judge Muir’s
conclusion that there is no parental constitutional right that would entitle him to a
grant of relief . . . . Insofar as a parental right of privacy has been recognized, it has
been in the context of determining the rearing of infants and, as Judge Muir put it,
involved ‘continuing life styles.’”).
123
Hermer, supra note 8, at 267-68 (quoting Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond,
David Reimer’s Legacy: Limiting Parental Discretion, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
5, 26-27 (2005)).
124
Lloyd, supra note 88, at 167-69 (citing research suggesting that there is a familial
parent-child bond that does not always exist, particularly with children who have a
disability).
125
Uslan, supra note 19, at 310-11.
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their child to “corrective” intersex surgery are often well-intentioned
and rely on the opinions of medical professionals.126 Under these
circumstances, a court evaluating the best interests of a child may very
well defer to the parent and doctor.127 In a fundamental rights
stalemate, it is not hard to imagine the constitutional parental right
trumping other interests—especially since life or death does not hang
in the balance.128 Thus, it is necessary to consider the State’s
intervening interest in “corrective” intersex in order to draw any
further conclusions.
C. The State’s Interest
As indicated, the State’s interest in regulating “corrective”
intersex operations is multifold. First, the State has a constitutional
duty not to arbitrarily interfere with an individual’s bodily integrity.
However, the Court has recognized a number of State interests that
justify the intrusion, including: “(1) protecting public safety or public
health; (2) protecting the individual’s own health or safety; (3)
determining guilt or innocence or searching for evidence of a crime;
(4) imposing discipline or punishment; and (5) protecting the integrity
of the medical profession.”129 Second, the State has a constitutional
duty not to impermissibly interfere with an individual’s right to
procreate.130 Again, the Court has found exceptions.131 Third, the
State also may not interfere with a parent’s constitutional right to the
“care, custody, and control” of their children.132 The exceptions to this
rule are related to another State responsibility: the duty to safeguard a
child’s welfare.133 This Section first looks at what State interests
might justify an interference with a child’s fundamental rights. This
Section will then balance those interests against the State’s obligation
not to interfere with parental rights.
i.

State Interests Justifying Interference

Typically, for a State to interfere with a fundamental right, the
intrusion must satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis—the State’s interest
126

Rosato, supra note 25, at 5.
Id.
128
Although, one could argue that a “corrective” intersex surgery results in the
“death” of the child’s gender identity.
129
Borgmann, supra note 52, at 1067 (citations omitted).
130
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
131
See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (finding the sterilization of disabled
women constitutional).
132
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
133
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (describing the doctrine of
parens patriae).
127
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must be compelling and narrowly-tailored.134 However, in the context
of a child’s fundamental rights, particularly a child’s right to bodily
integrity, courts have applied a less stringent tripartite balancing test—
weighing the child’s interest against the interests of the State and the
parents.135 Even so, the State must have some rational basis for its
decision to interfere with a child’s fundamental rights.136 This Part
considers two interests the State might have in allowing infants to be
subjected to “corrective” intersex surgery: (1) protecting the child
from social harms, and (2) disgust. Despite these interests, this Part
concludes by arguing that the State has a stronger interest in
disallowing the subjection of young children to “corrective” intersex
surgery.
a. Stigma
The Supreme Court has held that the State has an interest in
protecting children from social or psychological harm.137 The Court in
Prince v. Massachusetts held that the State was allowed to protect
children from “emotional excitement and psychological or physical
injury” and also stated that parents had no right to make martyrs out of
their children.138 Similarly, in holding that “separate but equal”
educational facilities violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education relied
heavily on social science data when it suggested that “[t]o separate
[minority children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”139 More recently, the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of protecting children from social harms in
Obergefell v. Hodges.140 In its explanation why the Constitution
protects the right to marry for same sex-couples, the Court stated:
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus
conflicts with a central premise of the right to
marry. Without the recognition, stability, and
predictability marriage offers, their children
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See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938).
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (“Accordingly, whether
respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”); Borgmann, supra
note 52, at 1069.
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Id.
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Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
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Id.
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347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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suffer the stigma of knowing their families are
somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant
material costs of being raised by unmarried
parents, relegated through no fault of their own
to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The
marriage laws at issue here thus harm and
humiliate the children of same-sex couples.141
These cases suggest that the State has a significant interest in
protecting children from stigmatic harm. As such, humiliation, inferior
treatment, or feeling “less than” are all harms from which the State can
protect children.142
Although protecting a child from stigma may be a legitimate,
or even compelling, State interest—it is limited to protecting a child
from stigma caused by State action. The law does not recognize
private biases as a legitimate source of stigma—thus, it cannot be the
basis for a law. The Supreme Court in Palmore v. Sidoti foreclosed on
the possibility of the law giving effect to private biases.143 In Palmore,
a Florida court found that it was in the child’s best interest to live with
her father because of the stigmatization the child might be subjected to
if she lived with her mother, who was married to a man of a different
race.144 Recognizing the potential “pressures and stresses” of a child
living with a stepparent of a different race, the Supreme Court
nonetheless struck down the ruling, concluding that “[t]he Constitution
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect.”145 Thus, while the State has an
interest in not promoting laws that subject children to stigma, those
laws also cannot be based on the private biases of society. Although
under Brown and Obergefell stigma can be constitutionally
problematic because it is the product of State action, Palmore suggests
that when the law gives effect to private bias, it perpetuates the stigma
and, therefore, is equally unconstitutional.146
141
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Stigma in the intersex context is problematic. Proponents of
“corrective” intersex surgery argue that there are a number of “social”
harms that can result from not performing gender assignment surgery
at birth. One argument suggests that a child with ambiguous genitalia
would be subject to “locker room teasing,” and, as a result, a child
might suffer from low self-esteem.147 Perhaps more grave, another
argument suggests that a genderless child living in a gendered society
might be treated as a second-class citizen, the consequences of which
could include the “failure of parents to relate to them, alienation from
society, the perception of embarrassment around the topic of their sex
or gender, and fragmentation of their family systems.”148 Similarly,
others have suggested that parents may not bond with or may even
reject a child with ambiguous genitalia, which would imaginably lead
to many other negative consequences for the child.149 In short,
proponents of early “corrective” intersex surgery are concerned the
child will be stigmatized if he or she has ambiguous genitalia.
“[S]tigma exists when labeling, negative
stereotyping, exclusion, discrimination, and low
status co-occur in a power situation that allows
these processes to unfold.” Stigma is a
significant force in most, if not all, societies. It
may be that issues involving stigma, as much as
anything else, can explain the reason that the
parents in the [intersex surgery] study . . . would
agree to cosmetic genital surgery on their
daughters even if they knew surgery might
result in diminished genital sensitivity. Parents
generally want their children to “fit in.”150
Allowing early surgical intervention, then, will supposedly
spare intersex children from humiliation and social stigmatization.
Proponents of surgery point to the anecdotal evidence of adults who
are satisfied with their gender-assignment and lead normal, healthy
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lives post-surgery.151 The proponents assert that the psychological and
cultural benefits of “corrective” intersex surgery outweigh almost any
medical risk, especially given improved medical technology, which
may preserve sexual function and fertility.152 Invoking the slipperyslope argument, proponents suggest that a moratorium on “corrective”
intersex surgery may prevent parents from consenting to other
“cosmetic,” non-medically necessary procedures, such as correcting a
cleft palate or removing facial deformities.153
Although a child with ambiguous genitalia might be treated
differently, this cannot be the basis of State action for two reasons: (1)
there is not enough evidence to support the conclusion that intersex
children are subject to stigmatization, and (2) even if there was
evidence supporting such a conclusion, the law cannot give effect to
society’s biases. First, there is very little data concerning how well
children with ambiguous genitalia interact with their peers, parents, or
other members of society.154 There is evidence, however, of the
trauma of multiple “corrective” surgeries.155 The medical procedures
themselves and their aftermath undermine the very purpose of making
the child “normal.”156 What’s more, a small study revealed that,
despite consenting to “corrective” intersex surgery on their infant,
many parents still did not consider their child to be “normal.”157
Without stronger evidence demonstrating actual harm to intersex
children with ambiguous genitalia, any State interest is difficult to
justify. Second, any statute allowing “corrective” intersex surgery to
be performed on a child would clearly violate the holding in
Palmore—the surgery itself is motivated by society’s prejudices.158
Much like the child in Palmore, intersex children, if stigmatized at all,
are only stigmatized by society’s private biases, furthered by the
existence of the gender binary.
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b. Disgust
Closely related to stigma, another possible motivation for State
interference with a child’s fundamental rights in the intersex context is
disgust.159 Disgust plays a powerful role in shaping our laws.160
Disgust “marks out moral matters for which we can have no
compromise.”161 Justice Scalia invoked disgust in his concurring
opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., stating:
Our society prohibits, and all human societies
have prohibited, certain activities not because
they harm others but because they are
considered, in the traditional phrase, “contra
bonos mores,” i.e., immoral. In American
society, such prohibitions have included, for
example,
sadomasochism,
cockfighting,
bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, and
sodomy. While there may be great diversity of
view on whether various of these prohibitions
should exist . . . there is no doubt that, absent
specific constitutional protection for the conduct
involved, the Constitution does not prohibit
them
simply
because
they
regulate
162
“morality.”
Similarly, the majority in Gonzales v. Carhart relied on disgust when
it upheld the ban on a particular type of abortion procedure: “The
Act’s ban on abortions that involve partial delivery of a living fetus
furthers the Government’s objectives . . . Congress could nonetheless
conclude that the type of abortion proscribed by the Act requires
specific regulation because it implicates additional ethical and moral
concerns that justify a special prohibition.”163
By allowing infants to be subjected to “corrective” intersex
surgery, one could argue that the State is motivated by morality or

159

However, it is unlikely that a State would not assert such a motivation.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Secret Sewers of Vice: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW 19, 20 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
161
Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in THE PASSIONS OF
THE LAW 63, 64 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (quoting WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE
ANATOMY OF DISGUST 194 (1997)).
162
501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
163
550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007); see also id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“But the
Act scarcely furthers that interest: The law saves not a single fetus from destruction,
for it targets only a method of performing abortion.”).
160

64

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol. 5:1

disgust. Disgust for intersexuality can best be explained by Mary
Douglas’ “matter out of place” theory.164 Disgust is our cultural
response to “any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict
cherished classifications.”165 It is a reaction to disorder and an attempt
to maintain systems and boundaries.166 For example, shoes—not
inherently disgusting when worn on feet—become dirty when they are
placed on the dining room table.167 Ambiguity or anomalies are by
definition unclassifiable—“matter out of place”—and thus elicit a
strong reaction of disgust.168 For example, Douglas suggests that if
penguins lived in the Near East during biblical times, they would have
been labeled “unclean” because they possess both fishlike and birdlike
characteristics.169 Similarly, syrup is disgusting because it is both a
liquid and a solid.170 Intersex children—in some sense a “hybrid” of
both genders—are “matter out of place” and, thus, are marginalized or
“corrected.”171 The State’s response to children born with ambiguous
genitalia, essentially recognizing the condition only as a medical
disorder, is an attempt to reestablish order and maintain boundaries.
Interestingly, disgust may also support an argument against
“corrective” intersex surgery. The court in Littleton v. Prange, when
describing the plaintiff’s gender reassignment surgery, suggested the
surgery “would make most males pale and perspire to contemplate.”172
Indeed, the specifics of “corrective” intersex surgery may invoke a
reaction of disgust, much like Congress’s reaction to the abortion
procedure at issue in Carhart.173
Despite the prevalence of disgust in our laws, the State cannot
use disgust divorced from harms to justify an interference with a
child’s fundamental rights. A pure disgust or morality rationale will
not stand constitutional muster.174 This principle was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas: “Moral disapproval of this
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection
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Clause.”175 Thus, unless the Supreme Court finds some other
concomitant State interest, moral disapproval of intersexuality will not
be a sufficient justification for allowing “corrective” intersex surgeries
to be performed on children.
ii.

State Interests in Protecting Right to Parent

As discussed, if a State acts to protect a child’s fundamental
rights, it is likely that a parent’s fundamental rights will be infringed
upon. Thus, the State’s power to intervene is limited to preventing
abuse, neglect, or other harms to the child.176 In order to exercise its
parens patriae powers, the State must provide a court with clear and
convincing evidence that intervention is necessary.177 It has been
suggested that in instances where competing fundamental rights are at
stake, the State’s parens patriae powers are at their strongest.178 If
that is the case, the State should have broad powers to intervene and
prevent parents from consenting or subjecting their child to
“corrective” intersex surgery. Although the right to parent is indeed
fundamental, the interests at stake for a child—bodily integrity,
procreation, dignity, and autonomy—are much weightier. The
significant challenge the State would face in protecting an intersex
child’s fundamental rights would be providing clear and convincing
evidence that “corrective” intersex surgery is actually harmful to the
child. Given that the data available is chiefly anecdotal, it would be
difficult to prove that it would be more likely than not that “corrective”
surgery would harm a child more than postponing the operation or
doing nothing. However, given that the surgery often offers no true
medical benefits, the State could argue that the supposed psychosocial
benefits of cosmetic gender-assignment surgery are unsupported.
iii.

Application of a State’s Rights in the Intersex Context

An interesting comparison between mandatory vaccination
laws and “corrective” intersex surgery demonstrates the difficulty of
balancing State interests and competing parental interests. As
Professors Chemerinsky and Goodwin explain in depth, compulsory
vaccination laws are constitutional.179 First, they cite to extensive case
law recognizing the constitutionality of compulsory vaccination laws.
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Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that “laws promoting public
health or safety fall under a state’s police power . . . individual rights
may need to yield to the state’s police power in order to preserve the
public health or safety.”180 Second, the professors consider competing
parental interests—namely freedom of religion and the constitutional
right to parent—and conclude that neither right is sufficient to
overcome the State’s interest in protecting the health of minors.181
It is unclear which way the compulsory vaccination precedent
cuts. For example, in Buck v. Bell, the Court cited to the Supreme
Court’s previous mandatory vaccination holding as support for the
constitutionality of cutting an institutionalized woman’s fallopian
tubes.182 Moreover, there is no constitutional case law that specifically
protects or forbids genital “normalization” surgery. Therefore, the
answer turns on whether the State’s interest in protecting a child from
a non-medically necessary, and highly invasive, surgery is comparable
to compulsory vaccination. First, the police power rationale does not
apply as strongly in the intersex context. In addition to protecting the
child from disease, mandatory vaccinations also create “herd
immunity” and protect the community at large from contracting deadly
illnesses.183 Whether children are, or are not, subjected to “corrective”
intersex surgery—they pose no risk to the health of others. Second, as
discussed earlier, it is hard to say what action is protective of a child’s
health. Normatively, it seems clear that removing a child’s healthy
genital tissue and reproductive organs is not a form of protection.
Practically, however, without clear guidance suggesting otherwise
from a doctor or a surgeon assigned to the individual child’s case,
maybe the State’s interest, or at least the State’s argument, is
weakened. This uncertainty perhaps underscores the need for clearer
and stronger constitutional protections for intersex children.
In sum, the State’s strongest interests in allowing “corrective”
intersex surgeries—protecting the child from psychosocial harms and
imposing morality—are unsupported and unconstitutional. Moreover,
the State’s interest in respecting parental autonomy is limited by the
potential for grave violations of a child’s fundamental rights. As such,
inaction by the State could possibly result in liability for violating a
child’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.

180

Id.
Id.
182
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.” (citing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
183
Id.
181

2016]

HANGING IN THE BALANCE

67

V. PART IV: RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the complicated nature of gender, sexuality, and sexual
orientation, this Article’s recommendation is not a “one-size-fits-all”
solution. For example, “corrective” intersex surgery may not
implicate a child’s fundamental right to procreate in every instance.
Similarly, the State may have a more compelling interest to intervene
when such issues are present. As such, a third-party neutral—such as
a family court or a special tribunal—should evaluate each case before
any irreversible medical procedures are performed. When considering
whether surgery is appropriate, the intermediary should weigh each of
the interests discussed above and any particular set of facts that may
affect the decision. In many circumstances, foregoing or postponing
surgery will best protect a child’s fundamental rights.
The courts of Colombia provide a model for what an intersex
tribunal may look like. In 1995, the Constitutional Court of Colombia
held that a team of doctors had violated a child’s constitutional right to
identity when it performed genital normalization surgery on him.184 In
1999, the Constitutional Court of Colombia limited a child’s parents’
ability to consent to genital normalization by creating a heightened
standard for consent.185 Three months later, the Constitutional Court
of Colombia clarified the heightened consent standard, explaining that
it required “[giving parents] detailed information about the advantages
and disadvantages of surgically altering their child's genitalia,
[allowing] ample periods of time to consider the alternatives to genitalnormalizing surgery, and [making] decisions in consideration of their
child's best interests.”186 This standard would be appropriate for
importation in U.S. courts as it appropriately recognizes the serious
constitutional implications at stake. However, while the standard is
appropriate, I would advocate for mandatory ex ante procedures. The
child from the 1999 Colombian case was spared irreparable harm
because the doctors refused to perform surgery without court
approval—and, ultimately, the Constitutional Court of Colombia
concluded that the surgery was unconstitutional.187 This should also be
the standard in the United States.
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VI. PART V: CONCLUSION
The issues surrounding intersexuality highlight a number of
broader legal questions, including questions about gender in the law
and competing liberty interests. For this reason, instead of treating
genital “normalization” surgery as a purely medical concern, it is
important to consider all legal ramifications before any action is taken.
A constitutional floor, bolstered by the State’s interest in protecting
minors, must be established and recognized in order to adequately
protect the fundamental rights of intersex children against the
constitutional rights of their parents.

